Security & Roadmap

This page describes the protocol's trust model, active security features, known limitations, invariants that should hold, and the remaining production-hardening roadmap. For the system design that these properties derive from, see Architecture.

Trust Model

Non-Custodial Properties

• The Strategy contract has no withdrawal function. Funds can only leave via distribute(), which routes to configured recipients through the SplitsWarehouse or, for same-factory child strategies, by direct transfer to the child contract. The owner can change where funds go (rebalance) but can never extract funds.
• Distribution is permissionless — anyone can call distribute(). This prevents funds from being locked by an inactive owner.
• Recipients self-custody — only the balance owner (or delegate) can call warehouse.withdraw(). No one can redirect, freeze, or force withdrawals.
• All off-chain social data (drafts, comments, reactions, notifications) is non-financial. The server can be compromised without risk to funds — on-chain state remains the source of truth.

Failure Isolation

• Each strategy is independent — no shared state except the warehouse.
• Batch deposits to the warehouse mean a reverting recipient does not block the others.
• Child strategies registered with the same factory receive allocations by direct transfer; the parent does not call distribute on the child, so the child's pause state or internal errors cannot block the parent's payout to other recipients.
• Factories are stateless beyond the implementation address and registry mappings — no admin path, no pause.

Security Features

• ReentrancyGuard on all state-changing functions (distribute, harvest, deposit, withdraw).
• PausableUpgradeable on Strategy and YieldRedirector4626 (owner-only circuit breaker). withdraw/redeem on the redirector remain callable while paused so depositors can always exit.
• Rebalance → distribute cooldown: rebalanceDistributeCooldown is an immutable on the factory; each clone reads it once at init. Every allocation change (including initialize) sets distributeUnlockAt = block.timestamp + cooldown. distribute() reverts with DistributeLocked(distributeUnlockAt) until it expires. This mitigates rebalance-front-running of large incoming donations without adding a two-step UX.
• Factory-owned registries: isFactoryStrategy and isFactoryRedirector mappings anchor identity to the deploying factory. Strategy._isStrategy() staticcalls the factory's registry rather than trusting a spoofable factory() return.
• Sender-bound deterministic CREATE2: createDeterministic derives keccak256(abi.encode(msg.sender, salt)), so different deployers cannot collide on the same salt. predictDeterministicAddress(deployer, salt) mirrors this.
• ENS label claim guards: StrategyFactory.assignPendingLabel(node, claimant) must pre-approve a strategy before it can consume an ENS name transferred to the factory. setENSName reverts UnknownStrategy for non-registered addresses.
• Harvest thresholds: YieldRedirector4626.harvest() reverts HarvestTooSoon when called inside minHarvestInterval, and HarvestBelowMinimum when harvestable() < minHarvestAmount. Both thresholds are set from factory immutables.
• ERC-4626 max* overrides: maxDeposit, maxMint, maxWithdraw, and maxRedeem clamp to the source vault's limits and the currently tracked principal.
• sweep(token, to) rescues accidentally-sent tokens on the redirector. Source-vault shares are explicitly excluded (CannotSweepSourceShares).
• SafeERC20 for all token operations; forceApprove(warehouse, 0) after every ERC-20 batch deposit.
• Checks-Effects-Interactions pattern throughout.
• Custom errors for gas efficiency.
• _disableInitializers() on implementation contracts.

Invariants

Strategy

• totalWeight == sum(allocations[i].weight).
• allocations.length > 0 && allocations.length <= 50.
• All recipients non-zero; no recipient equals the strategy itself.
• While a call to distribute is executing, block.timestamp >= distributeUnlockAt.

YieldRedirector4626

• totalAssets() == principal (wrapper share price stays 1:1 with the underlying asset).
• harvestable() == max(sourceVault.convertToAssets(vaultShares) - principal, 0).
• principal is denominated in asset units and is decremented by the delivered amount on withdraw and harvest (never by the shares burned).
• Under source-vault losses, principal is best-effort: wrapper depositors share the loss proportionally via max* clamps.

Known Limitations

Token Compatibility

Production Roadmap

Shipped items reflect the audit-fix pass.

Security hardening

• Rebalance → distribute cooldown (configurable per factory)
• Pausable Strategy and YieldRedirector4626
• Factory-owned strategy / redirector registries + spoof-resistant routing
• Sender-bound deterministic CREATE2 salts
• Child strategies: push-only transfer from parent (no nested distribute)
• Internal audit pass
• Minimum-distribution threshold
• Multisig + timelock ownership for factory / strategy pause authority
• External security audit by a reputable firm

Yield Redirector

• Live-value accounting (totalAssets() returns principal, harvestable() returns live surplus)
• minHarvestAmount and minHarvestInterval
• sweep() for non-source tokens
• ERC-4626 max* overrides
• External reward-token harvesting
• Additional vault standards beyond ERC-4626

Token support

• Allowlist or runtime detection for non-standard tokens
• Wrapper strategies for fee-on-transfer tokens
• Documented deposit warnings in the UI

Governance

• Governor-controlled strategies
• Multi-sig approval on large rebalances
• Time-weighted allocation changes

Social layer

• Rate limiting on REST endpoints
• Spam prevention for comments/reactions
• Notification delivery (email, push) beyond polling
• Comment moderation tools

Ecosystem

• Base Sepolia multi-tenant deployment
• Additional L2 deployments (Optimism, Arbitrum)
• Integration with streaming distribution (Drips)
• On-chain curator reputation / scoring
• Additional tenants beyond support.eth

Technical Specifications

Contract Standards

• Solidity ^0.8.20
• OpenZeppelin Contracts (Upgradeable)
• EIP-1167 Minimal Proxy Clones
• ERC-6909 Multi-Token Warehouse (via 0xSplits)
• ERC-4626 Vault Standard (Yield Redirector)
• ERC-7528 ETH Address Convention

Gas (approximate)

Networks

External Dependencies

• SplitsWarehouse (0xSplits)
• ENS (Ethereum Name Service)
• Ponder (indexer)
• viem / wagmi (SDK)